Author: Pranab Kumar Panday
Image Courtesy : Simon Reza
Introduction
Addressing the advantages of decentralisation, Rondinelli (1981) has argued that, through the decentralisation of power involving local participation in decision-making in developing countries, the pace and spread of the benefits of growth can be accelerated and scarce resources can be used more efficiently for promoting development in poverty stricken or economically-lagging areas. It is believed that decentralisation creates an opportunity for a government to come closer to the governed, both spatially and institutionally, and thereby become more knowledgeable and responsive to local needs (Rondinelli, 1981).
In line with decentralisation policies of different developing countries, the government of Bangladesh, over the last four decades, has pursued a policy of decentralisation as a means of nation-building, poverty reduction, and integration of the general population into the processes of decision-making. Notwithstanding the official rhetoric, however, various studies have questioned the true motives of the government in decentralising power and functions to local governments (Ahmed, Boex, Momen & Panday, 2015; Panday, 2011a; Panday & Assaduzzaman, 2011). The studies have argued that, while nearly all successive governments and associated political regimes of the country have made changes to the structure of local government bodies in the name of decentralisation, the changes have mainly served as a mechanism to strengthen their political and economic power bases at the local level. In the process, instead of facilitating the effective devolution of power at the sub-national level, every government has retained power to control local governments. As a result, local governments have suffered from problems relating to autonomy and independence that have often made them fully dependent on the central government.
In response, this article analyses the functioning of local government bodies, with a particular focus on the manifestations and implications of central government control. The discussion is confined to the functioning of the Upazila Parishad (UZP), which is the second tier of the existing local government structure, the decentralisation of which is presently one of the most debated issues of decentralisation in the country. Three questions are addressed on the basis of a descriptive and exploratory case study (Yin, 1994) of Godagari UZP in Rajshahi district, in respect of which both primary and secondary data were collected. The questions are: What mechanisms are being used by the central government to control the functioning of the UZP? To what extent is central control affecting the functioning of the UZP? What are the ultimate outcomes of central control on the functioning of the UZP?
The primary data comprise responses to an open-ended questionnaire and interviews with a range of people immediately involved in decentralisation initiatives, including central and local politicians and administrators. The data are complemented by material drawn from relevant legislation, books and journal articles.
Central control over the working of the Upazila Parishad
The main mechanisms of central control include legal control through the imposition of rules and regulations with which the UZP needs to comply; financial control through the delineation and enforcement of sources of revenue; control through the MP by giving the MP an obligatory advisory role concerning UZP affairs; and control through the central bureaucracy which is empowered to oversee the activities of the UZP. As a result of these and related controls, the effective attainment of the ultimate objectives of the UZP, which are to facilitate development and bring the bureaucracy under the control of the people’s representatives at the local level, has been greatly affected to the detriment of local initiative and community responsiveness.
Legal control through rules and regulations
Several rules and regulations made pursuant to the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction and Amendment) Act (2009) significantly restrict the functioning of the UZP. For example, one set of rules stipulates how meetings are to be conducted and requires that a copy of the proceedings of meetings, along with all local orders made by the UZP, be sent to the central department responsible for local governments, as well as to the MP of the relevant constituency. Another prescribes processes by which budgets are to be determined and requires that the budgets be sent to the local government department before the commencement of each financial year, with the possibility of adjustments being made to them. These and other controls concerning such matters as local planning processes and procedures can create tension and conflicts in the determination of local priorities between the UZP and central government. They are representative of how the government has retained considerable scope to keep a constant watch on the functioning of the UZP, which is contrary to the basic philosophy of decentralisation concerning the UZP level of local government.
Financial control
Article 35 of the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction and Amendment) Act (2009) prescribes the existence of the UZP Fund. This fund has two parts: the UZP revenue reserve and the UZP development reserve. The UZP revenue reserve fund is formed on the basis of local resources available to the Upazila, with provision for any surplus amounts to be deposited into the UZP development reserve after all of the expenditure of the UZP from the revenue reserve has been met. The government requires that all local resources for which the UZP is responsible be used properly, and that new sources be identified to increase the possible supply of local resources. A consequence is that the UZP needs to ensure not only that the maximum amount of money is deposited into the development reserve, but also that other sources of income are found and able to be utilised.
Control by the Member of Parliament
Article 25 of the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction and Amendment) Act (2009) provides for the MP to be an advisor of the UZP in their constituency. Acceptance of the MP’s advice is obligatory for the UZP. Also, when communicating with the central government on a particular issue, the UZP must inform the MP about the subject matter to be communicated. The obligatory advisory role of the MP is a significant stumbling block in the effective functioning of the UZP. Given the political culture of Bangladesh, both the MP and the UZP council seek to attain supremacy at the local level. By virtue of being a national lawmaker, the MP is perceived as more powerful by government officials. Thus, in most cases, officials support the MP in the advisory process, with the MP frequently trying to manipulate the decisions of the UZP. This can hinder the work not only of the UZP itself, but also of various local organisations with which it interacts in providing representation and development assistance
Control by the bureaucracy
The support of officials for the MP is compounded by other ways in which officials influence the operation of the UZP and, thus, strengthen the control of the central government. Particularly significant are the attitudes and approaches of senior officials. The elitism of the administration cadre has put senior officials in a position to exert considerable control over the activities of the UZP. Their assumed supremacy is reflected in how they often address the UZP chairperson in rather demeaning terms, despite the position occupied by the latter being of a relatively high rank in the governmental system. More significantly, their control is manifest in the extent to which they are authorised to be involved in particular UPZ affairs.
Some specific consequences of central control
Excessive control by the central government has made the UZP non-functional in significant respects, quite contrary to government and community expectations. Three crucial issues concerning its operation are affected considerably: the formulation of budgets and plans, the establishment of committees, and the monitoring of the activities of deconcentrated departments. Despite having a clear direction concerning the preparation of a yearly budget and both short term and long term plans, the Godagari UZP has often not acted as required. With regard to the budget, it has sometimes simply considered its statements of income and expenditure to be the budget, despite the chairperson and central official being well aware of what ought to be done. This failing concerning the budget has been the result of reluctance by the official, coupled with inadequate funding and the UZP not having its own relevant staff and, thus, needing to rely on staff under the control of the official.
Concluding observations
It is essential for any working democracy to have a local government system that is self-governing and yet accountable to a higher authority. Like other countries, legislation in Bangladesh calls for a distribution and separation of power between national and local governments. The problem in Bangladesh, however, is that the political leadership has not believed in decentralising power in a way that genuinely gives people below them authority to monitor and control their local affairs. On this, the government and the opposition have been of the same view. They have overlooked the very spirit of democracy, simply adding wherever possible to their already considerable power. Accordingly, whenever they have seen some need to take decentralising initiatives, they have retained extensive control over what local governments can do and how they can operate. The result has been a failure to establish a strong and participatory system of local government through which local participation, accountability and transparency can be ensured.
References
Ahmed, N., Boex, J., Momen, M., & Panday, P. (2015). The local government system in Bangladesh: A comparative analysis of perspectives and practices. Union Parishad Governance Project and Upazila Parishad Governance Project. Dhaka: UNDP.
Panday, P. K. (2011a). Local government system in Bangladesh: How far is it decentralised? Lex Localis: Journal of Local Self Government, 9, 205–230.
Panday, P. K., & Assaduzzaman, M. (2011). Politics, problems and trends of decentralized local governance in Bangladesh. In I. Jamil, A. M. Aminuzzaman, S. Askvik, & S. T. M. Haque (Eds.), Understanding governance and public policy in Bangladesh (pp. 153–174). Dhaka: North South University Press.
Rondinelli, D. A. (1981). Government decentralization in comparative perspective: Theory and practice in developing countries. International Review of Administrative Science, 47, 136– 145.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: design and methods. (2ed ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Author Description:
Dr. Pranab Kumar Panday is a Professor at the Department of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi
0 Comments